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I think I can truly say you’ve been too kind because after a build-up like that I’m
not sure I can get through this without disappointing everyone. Nevertheless, I look
forward to being able to share with you some reflections on the themes that we were
able to discuss and during the last two days. The first thing I would like to look at is
why should an American be concerned about European security at all. 
I think its a fair question. First of all, if we looked back five hundred years ago, Spain
discovered America, and continuously from that time on there’s been one strategic theater
involving Europe and America. Spain’s discovery of America was an event which changed
Spain’s position in Europe and thus set the tone for the kind of linked, or interdependent,
futures that Europe and America have experienced ever since. When you go forward
through the other centuries almost everytime there was a major war or fighting in the
Americas, a strategic element linked the fortunes of both America and Europe. For example,
when Britain and the Netherlands were fighting over control of the North Sea, the city
of New York, which was then the dominant strategic position on the western edge of the
Atlantic Ocean, changed hands from the Dutch to the British. And when the French and
the British were fighting the war of Austrian Succession, the North American British
colonies were fighting with the British against the French in Canada, which is why in the
United States they call the conflict the “French and Indian War”. 
The struggle for our own independence was also very connected with Europe. We
were assisted by loans and material from - no surprise here- the Netherlands and France,
and we were also assisted militarily before the end of the war by French forces. Even
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after the severing of the colonial tie, the trans-Atlantic space continued to be one strategic
theater. During the Napoleanic Wars, the United States doubled in size by the purchase
of Louisiana from France, a sale triggered by difficulties to France in its relations with
Haiti. Although it’s hard to imagine exactly how the French made the calculation, it
was a good deal for us. On the negative side though, before the Napoleanic Wars were
over the British had burned down Washington.
When you go forward to the 19th century you see the same European-American
dynamic interaction. There was, for example, during our Civil War very intense
diplomacy from both the North and the South with European countries; and soon
after the war’s ending, we bought Alaska from Russia - also another very good deal. By
the end of the 19th century, the composition of the American population had changed
so radically because of the massive influx of people from Ireland, Scandinavia, Germany
and from Central and Southern Europe that today, supposedly, the largest ethnic group
in the American population is German, and the two countries that have the highest
percentage of their population having emigrated to the United States are Ireland and
Sweden. All in all then, there is fair reason for an American to be concerned about
European security. After all, we’ve had the Consulate here for 200 years for a purpose.
The concern is not new; it’s something that has gone on now for five hundred years.
It’s not ominous. It’s not threatening. I think the interest is normal.
The second question I’d like to look at is where the current partnership comes
from, where it originates. And since you have to choose something to start with, what
I would like to start with is something that happened almost fifty years ago to this week
- actually it happened on June 15, 1947. George Marshall, who had been the senior
American military officer during the Second World War, had been asked by President
Truman to be Secretary of State. He accepted. Soon afterwards, he was invited to go
up to Harvard University to deliver an address to the graduating class. There, Marshall,
who was a man who knew how to get to the point, delivered certainly one of the most
famous statements of American public policy in our history, and a statement which
truly changed the kind of world that we lived in. It’s only eight paragraphs long. I’d
like to quote some of what he said and go through it with you because I think it does
explain a lot how America has looked at Europe and European security, and at our
connection with Europe for two generations. And I believe it will continue to influence
how we look at Europe into the next century. 
He said that the problem that had to be addressed was the dire state of the European
economy and that the solution to this lay in finding a way to restore the confidence of
the European peoples in their own future. I’ll read now a little bit from what George
Marshall said: “Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against
hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working
economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions
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in which free institutions exist.... Any government that is willing to assist in the task
of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States
government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries
cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups
which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or
otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.”
He went on to say that it wasn’t for the Americans to decide how Europe should
be rebuilt. What the Europeans had to do was to get together and draw up some plan
that was satisfactory to themselves about how they saw Europe being rebuilt The US
would then offer advice in trying to draw up a plan, and the US would not be lagging
in providing support for it. From an American point of view, that policy, to me, shows
some of the more enduring qualities of the approach we’ve adopted to Europe and to
other aspects of our foreign policy. Within two years NATO was founded. 
In preparing for this speech I went back and read a number of things, finding
among others a reference made to a quotation about the founding purposes of NATO
from the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, which read that NATO was
founded “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down”. Such
a view didn’t fit Marshall’s description of why we were involved with Europe, though.
The main purpose of NATO then and now (and I’ll be very brief) is the political
purpose, which is to protect and promote the values of free institutions; the second is
to foster cooperation among members on political and military questions; and the third
is to consult on joint action in response to an attack. 
Of course, when NATO was founded the specificity of its purposes was very clear
because the joint response was framed in terms of responding to a Soviet attack. I think if
there is a lesson from those fifty years, from the situation as it was then in 1947-1949 and
how we’ve gotten to where we are now, the first lesson I would draw is that if the United
States and its allies agree on the measures to be taken for their own security, they can have
security. There are obviously a lot of discussions over how the arrangements should be
made, but I don’t believe that capacity should be questioned. Fate is in our hands. 
I thought a lot about the title of the conference because (as I don’t think in Spanish,
I think in English) the term “Seguridad Europea” (European Security) is somewhat
ambiguous. In the first instance, I think it means security in Europe, which I just talked
about. Still, it means at least two other things to me, beginning with security for Europe.
In other words, not security right “here” but security that deals with issues and threats
that come from “nearby” and which, in turn, involves the question what would
Europeans do - indeed, what would Europeans and Americans want to do - regarding
these issues and threats. 
Now, I’d like to focus on one aspect of the discussion which has been missing
from the discussions these past two days, and this is one which concerns some public
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attitudes that are present in the debate over NATO enlargement and some of the reasons
put forth to support NATO’s intentions. One wouldn’t really know it from the
discussions we’ve had, but there are well meaning, well-informed, thoughtful individuals
who don’t agree with NATO enlargement. Therefore, I think it’s fair, given the nature
of the kind of relationship that Americans and Europeans should have, that we be
allowed to go over the reasons quickly just to know what they are.
First, I’d like to start off with some results of a poll last month in the United States.
86% of the people polled said that President Clinton should focus on domestic policy and
only 7% said he should focus on foreign policy, whereas (and this is relevant to the comment
I made yesterday that we’ve turned back half of the money we used to spend on foreign
policy) 61% of those polled favored maintaining NATO despite the end of the Cold War.
It’s interesting to note, therefore, that in the discussion in the United States there is no
credible opinion that says the object of policy should be the end of NATO. Instead, the
debates are over, to paraphrase, “since the whole world has changed, how do you continue
having a constructive security relationship including NATO with our European allies?”
Only 20% of the people polled followed the debate on NATO enlargement, but among
that group a large majority favors enlargement. Almost twice as many fear that Russia will
threaten its European neighbors if NATO is not enlarged. In other words, these people
think that Russia would threaten its neighbors if there is no enlargement because such a
decision means these countries will never be our allies, despite whatever changes their
political system has gone through and in spite of the political language in the NATO
Charter. We would thereby dig deeper a line that divides Europe. Finally, a slight majority
would broaden NATO’s mission to include interests outside of Europe.
And so here I’d like to go over some of the arguments that have been raised about
NATO enlargement itself. Here, the place to start is with George Kennan, a most
distinguished American diplomat and diplomatic historian, who wrote at the beginning
of this year that “expansion would be the most fateful error of American foreign policy
in the entire post-Cold War era.” He explained that “expansion” (what President Clinton’s
Administration calls “enlargement”) would inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and
militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion. “Expansion” would have an adverse affect on
the development of Russian democracy and would restore the atmosphere of the Cold
War of East-West relations. Another argument was put forward by the British historian
Paul Kennedy, who had written the “Rise and Fall of the Great Powers”. His theory was
that the greatest risk to the United States was “imperial overstretch”; that Washington,
in his analysis, was about to repeat the mistake made by London in East Europe during
the 1920s and 30s by giving security guarantees to borders in Eastern Europe without
changing the military strategy adequately in order to be able to uphold that commitment;
and that, as a result, there would be a large and dangerous gap between the objectives of
policy and the assets made available for military strategy. 
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The third argument goes back to the question of drawing lines, although this one
is a little harder to deal with: Some people would say if you don’t enlarge, you’re
reinforcing a line that already exists and others would say if you do enlarge, you’re
drawing a new line. So, no matter how you do it, no matter what NATO does, I’m
afraid there’s a line in our future. The fourth argument is one I certainly think ought
to be thought about more as it relates to Kennan’s warning that, since European security
increasingly depends on a series of arms reductions agreements that have been concluded
in the last ten years (particularly the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe),
enlargement of NATO would impede progress in arms control. Indeed, the head of
the security council in Moscow, Mr. Rybkin, said this week that NATO “expansion”
would make the ratification of Start 11 “almost impossible”. Finally, I’d like to mention
the fifth and quite common argument, which is that NATO is a special purpose defense
alliance and that “expansion” of it would simply destroy its purpose. 
There are answers to these questions, but I think the easiest thing to point out is
that the answers have to come in terms of policy. What we’re talking about here are
political choices, not simply debating points. Therefore, I’d like to look at some of the
suggestions raised in a recent article by former secretary of state, James Baker, a man
who’s known for being fairly hard-headed and realistic. He emphasized the point that
the core essence of NATO is its political function; that is, to try to ensure that there
is an environment conducive for free institutions and that the success of that function
has to be the test. The fact that the Cold War has ended and that there is no longer a
Soviet threat directed at the Western Alliance is not a reason for giving up an institution
that has helped create an environment conducive to the spread of free institutions. He
went on to suggest that just as NATO had met the old threat, surely the Alliance should
be adaptable enough to meet new threats, and that the new threats would probably
require less conventional responses to deal with them. He cited in particular some of
the things that have been mentioned here such as the development of task forces and
different means of cooperation within the Alliance. He also suggested that because the
future is not subject to prediction (which is something worthwhile remembering - a
little humility about the future is normally in good order), it was terribly important
that NATO continue as a place for consultative relations both among members and
with other actors in the area.
So, as all this shows, there is in the scope of European security a rich agenda that
includes enlargement, the Founding Act, the discussion of arms control agreements,
operations by the OSCE, and the EU’s participation. Regarding the EU, however (and
the following is important as it reflects a certain strain of thought in American public
opinion), people in the United States do raise the question: “Why are Europeans ready
to pledge their honor to protect the borders of countries in Eastern Europe, but they
won’t allow their tomatoes in?” 
147
A Reflection on European Security
Fundació CIDOB, 1997
The final thing I’d like to do is to ask some questions, as it says in the title of the
conference ‘to the next century’, which should be a very risky thing to talk about, but
I want to try. What concerns me is (and this a point John Roper made very eloquently
yesterday) what about security by Europeans. What about not just dealing with sort
of our own in-house problems and worrying about ourselves or dealing with the people
who are right next to us and the problems they might cause for us in our neighborhood.
Rather, what about trying to look a little further ahead and trying to look a little farther
away. The address made by your Minister of Defense yesterday was very far-seeing in
this regard because he repeatedly recalled that, in the end, healthy societies have to do
this in order to prepare for their future. And so there are a couple of thoughts that came
to me that I wanted to share with you.
First, some things about the United States: There continues to be a great influx
of immigration into the United States. Actually, in recent years we’ve had more
immigration in total numbers than at any other time in our history. I live in New York;
42% of the people in New York - 42% - were born outside of the United States, while
in Los Angeles the statistics say it’s 43%. This is a society that is changing: about 15%
of the American population are African Americans, and roughly 15% are Hispanic
Americans - a percentage that’s rising. However, the group that is rising most in relative
terms are Asian Americans. And the reason why I’m mentioning this is because (as a
result of immigration and the ties that are born from it) we are becoming more Asian
in our outlook as a society, which is a tendency particularly true of elites. 
Case in point: If you look at all the other secretary of states in the last fifty years,
when they made their first trip overseas they went to three or four European capitals,
then they went home. When Secretary of State Albright came to Europe, she went to
three or four European capitals: She then went to Moscow, Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing,
which was the right thing to do. This was a realistic, smart, intelligent thing to do
because relations with those countries are becoming increasingly important for us, as
they are to Europeans, aslo. True: Our relations with Moscow have long been very
important but, due to the specific character of our historical diplomatic relations, it
wasn’t necessarily where you started out to visit as secretary of state.
There’s also been a shift in the choice of foreign policy channels to work through.
Just as Europeans have shifted much of their energies in their foreign policies to working
through European institutions, in the last decade the United States has been accomplishing
a lot more with the Mexicans and Canadians (for example, in NAFTA), which only
makes sense: they live right next to us. In addition, we’ve started more consultations with
countries in the Asian-Pacific region, which absorbs the majority of our foreign trade.
And as I just indicated with Secretary Albright’s trip, the bilateral relationships with
Russia, China and Japan have increased in importance, particularly in terms of dealing
with issues that aren’t strictly, say, US-Japanese issues; here, I’m referring to matters of
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mutual concern for Japan and the US in Guatemala, for instance. Seen this way the
fabric, or the network, of foreign policy is becoming much more dense and diversified. 
What do I as an American diplomat see happening in Europe regarding your
changing perspectives as you look at a new century? Well, it’s obvious that, as I said,
increasingly your energies are directed towards each other. Yesterday, Professor Vilanova
said in reference to the situation in Bosnia that fifteen actors can only agree on a lowest
common denominator and that that can not solve problems. Although I have mixed
feelings about Bosnia and how it was solved, I think it is nevertheless a fair issue to think
about. In my view, Europe finds it very difficult to think about the use of force in foreign
policy. As it stands now, to say you have a joint foreign policy means that you are able
to agree on a commercial policy, you are able to agree on humanitarian policy, and you
are able to agree on foreign policy when deep-seated interests and perspectives are not
at stake. Though when deep-seated interests and perspectives are at stake, you can’t
agree, and not agreeing means you don’t act. This is not because you have a lack of
institutions: This is because you have a lack of will to act. The reason why force was
not used in Bosnia by the European institutions or by the Western Alliance was because
Western allies did not agree that force be used. Eventually, that changed. And though
the United States had wanted force used for a longer period of time, I could not make
an argument I know it would have been effective. No one is picking on anyone here;
still, I think it’s important to understand it’s not that Europeans have bad institutions.
But if one wonders why nothing was done, it’s simply because decisions weren’t made
to do it. Maybe I’m being simplistic, but that’s the way I look at it.
What would I suggest as to the kind of collective approach we might have as we
look ahead? Although the Minister’s speech having mostly covered this ground, I’m
going to go over a few things again. First, dialogue is highly important, just as the title
of the conference reminds us.  Dialogue is extremely important with Russia. We were
told yesterday by Dr. Baranovsky that “Russia has been downgraded, marginalized,
and disengaged”. Whether NATO ‘expands’ or doesn’t ‘expand’, Russia should not be
“downgraded, marginalized, and disengaged”. We need a rich dialogue with Russia.
What’s more, and gauging from the tenor of the discussions we’ve heard here (including
the many valid perceptions from those this city is home to), obviously we all need a
dialogue with the Mediterranean, where incidentally the United States first deployed
its forces and had diplomatic establishments. We need dialogue with other areas that
aren’t just our home area, too: We need it with Asia. And in pursuing this dialogue,
we all have to be careful that we don’t contribute to the idea that because that one
group of people is Catholic and Protestant, or that another group of people had ancestors
who went to Orthodox churches, or some people were Muslims, that they have to be
different and they have to have clashes and they have to have security problems. People
who are different can find ways to cooperate.
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In our own relations, as it is now there is both cooperation and competition
between the United States and Europe. Quite simply, what we have to do then is to
find ways to emphasize the things that we can cooperate on. If we want to be good
partners, we have to have projects that we work on together. You can’t have a healthy,
long-term relationship with another society and do nothing with it that you care
about. There are, after all, enough changes in the world for us to cooperate
meaningfully on. Two weeks ago, I was in Zaire in response to the most recent crisis
situation there (and this is apropos to an issue which you can read about in the
newspapers - that Americans are supposedly at the French throat all the time): When
we stopped at Paris after being in Zaire, we spoke to the people in the Ministries in
Paris that deal with Zaire, and one adviser working for President Chirac who is
depicted as being the most conservative or most difficult to deal with was asked by
United States Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson, “What would
you like us to do?”, and he said “Well, I want you to make a public statement that
makes these points.” It was no problem: Ambassador Richardson did it. There wasn’t
a fundamental clash of interests. There might have been twenty years ago, but not
today. I would take that kind of cooperation as the example - if you don’t make the
effort, it’s more likely to be seen as a clash. If you make the effort, you can find things
that are positive you can collaborate on, which I think creates a dynamism that’ll
help move us all through some of the uncharted waters out there.
Agreeing with another point which the Minister made, I do think we have to
welcome change. He mentioned globalization, scientific and technological innovation,
looking East and South, and he also mentioned Spain’s low birth rate. If we become
timid before these harbingers of changes, we won’t do very well in the future. We have
to welcome change. And we have to welcome it with more than just having an attitude
that we like change or that we’re interested by it. By this I mean the following (and
this gets to some of the comments on “think tanks” we’ve heard- I don’t know if you
need a ‘tank’ to ‘think’, but you do need to think): You can’t really face the future only
by having an attitude about it. You have to think about it enough so you have an
objective, so you have a plan, so you have something that you want to do, welcoming
change with energy.
Finally, the other point I’d like to make looks at the touchstone of (for worse
probably) international relations, that is - how we make decisions about the use of
force. Since I’ve already made some remarks about the difficulties European institutions
have in constructing a foreign policy that includes contemplating that question, the
following is a question that I rather have for you. I don’t have the answer- but when
I look at Europe I wonder how can Europeans legitimize the use of force unless the
decision is made by politicians who have an immediate responsibility to the electorate
that they are going to turn to and say give me your young people to go to that
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dangerous place and either be shot at or to use force in order to accomplish an objective.
When those decisions are made nationally, there’s an immediate response. And though
this may be a very American perspective, I feel when you make the decisions about
the use of force not nationally but at the European level, you raise vital questions
about legitimacy, objectives, and political responsibility. To this American it seems
that national governments are still more capable than European institutions to make
decisions on the use of force.
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